Network Growth via Preferential Attachment based on Prisoner's Dilemma
  Game by Toyota, Norihito
ar
X
iv
:0
70
5.
43
42
v2
  [
ph
ys
ics
.so
c-p
h]
  1
2 S
ep
 20
07
Network Growth via Preferential Attachment based on
Prisoner’s Dilemma Game
Norihito Toyota
Hokkaido Information University, Ebetsu, Nisinopporo 59-2, Japan
email :toyota@do-johodai.ac.jp
Abstract
In this article we discuss network growth based on Prisoner’s Dilemma Game(PDG) where
palyers on nodes in a network palay with its linked players. The players estimate total profits
according to the payoff matrix of the PDG. When a new node is attached to the network, the
node make linkes to nodes in the network with the probabilities in proportion to the profits
made by the game. Iterating this process, a network grows. We investigate properties of
this type of growing networks, especially the degree distribution and time-depending strategy
distribution by running computer simulation. We also find a sort of phase transition in the
strategy distributions. For these phenomena given by computer simulation, theoretical studies
are also carried out.
keywords: Network Growth, Game Theory, Prisoner’s Dilemma, Degree Distribution, Phase
Transition
1 Introduction
At the close of the 20th century, many empirical networks in real world turn out to be scale free or
small world networks[1, 2, 3, 4, 5], rather than random networks[6]. At the same time, it becomes
clear that in what way should we construct these networks. In those ways networks are mainly
constructed by some outside algorithms, only depending of the topology of the networks[7]. In
the growing way such as preferential attachment[1, 2], priferential nodes will forever preserve the
position as preferrer. In real systems, however, such situations are not universal. Depending on
a dynamics of a system, priferential nodes may change moment by moment. In this article we
consider the innner dynamics on a network to influence which are preferential nodes. Thus we
explore the interactions between an inner dynamics on a network and network growing. Such
network growing seems to be more universal than models without some inner dynamics. Though
many flexible model have been proposed, in which fitness[8], aging[9, 10, 11, 12] , hierarchy[13]
and so on have been considered, there are little dynamical models accompanied with interactions
among nodes in a network.
As considering an innner dynamics on a networks, we need to introduce some inner degree of
freedom to realize interactions. In this article we adopt Prisoner’s Dilemma game (PD)[14, 15, 16],
which is used in various fields, economics, sociology, biology and so on, as a dynamics on networks.
In this case, the types of strategies, cooperation (C) and defection (D), which correspond to the
inner degree of freedom are two. Iteration of games played by players arranged in two dimensional
space has been first considered on regular lattice by Nowark and May[17, 18]. After that many
reserchers have studied the subject[19]. Researchs in game theory related to complex networks,
which was anticipated by Ref. [20], are summarized in Ref. [21] well. The relations between a
network topology and a game dynamics on the network have been also investigated by some athors
[22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31].
In this article we use game thaory for growing networks[32]. We first simulate network growing
based on PDG dynamics by changeng a parameter that represents payoff of PDG, and analyze the
results. We first focus the time series of the population of two strategies. A phase transition like
phenomenon appears when changing the parameter where all D world turns into all C world all at
once. Then we investigae the degree distributions of resultant networks. They are mainly classified
into two types of forms, depending on the parameter. The turnning point is the critical point in
the D-C transition. We also discuss these phenomena from theoretical point of view and some
are quantitatively derived. A comment is also made on a relation between a sahpe of probability
function and degree distribution function.
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In the section two we formulate the algorithm for network growing studied in this article. We
give simulation results in the section three and theoretical analyses are given in the next section.
The last section, five, is devoted to summary.
2 Model for Network Growing
We describe the model for network growing investigated in this article.
1. Start a complete graph with k + 1 nodes on which either strategy C or D are assigned at
random.
2, The nodes play PDG with their (first k+1) linked nodes including themselves on the network
3. Each node i evaluates the total payoff Ri acquired from her/his neighborhood according to
the payoff matrix given by Table 1.
4. Each node i mimics the strategy of the node with the highest payoff among linked nodes.
5. Add a new node with a strategy chosen randomly.
6. Then new links from the new node to k ones among already existing nodes are connected
with the probability Pi depending on the total payoffs of the exsiting nodes;
Pi =
1
1 + exp(−Ri/A)
, (1)
where A is some positive constant.
7. The procedures from 2. to 6. are iteratively carried out n times.
As considering preferential attachments relative to payoff, it is natural that the probability Pi
that are linked with a newly joining node is proportional to acquired payoffs. Now notice that
payoffs can take both positive and negative values, since total payoff is zero in the payoff matrix
of PDG. Then we use Eq. (1) as an extention of simple preferential attachment in the step 6. A
little discussion will be given for this later on. We mainly analyze the time series of population of
nodes with C or D strategy and degree distribution by commputer simulations.
Table 1. Payoff table(matrix) of PD game on which t > c > d > S is imposed.
strategy C D
C (c, c) (s, t)
D (t, s) (d, d)
3 Results of Computer Simulations
We choose k = 5 , A = 30 and t = −s = 5 as parameters for the procedure for network growing
described in the previous, and n = 1000 as long as convergence is out of question. We determine
c+ d+ s+ t = 0 so that the average payoff can be 0 in the payoff matrix. So c = −d is a variable.
It is studied how the features of a network system vary according to this variable c.
3.1 Degree Distribution
Main results of simulations are the following.
EFor c < 4, the strategy of the network converges into all D and then degree distribution looks
like linear (See Fig.1).
EFor c > 4.4, the strategy of the network converges into all C and then degree distribution looks
like exponential one (See Fig.2).
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Fig1. Degree distribution for n =1200, c =4.0@ Fig2. Degree distribution for n =1000, c = 4.5
in a logarithmic scale for the vertical axis.
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According to one’s expectation, D as a dominant strategy is prevalent as c takes small values.
As c gets bigger, all nodes comes to take a strategy C. When the system shifts from all D to all C
world at a critical c value, the feature of degree distribution changes as well. The abovementioned
features in degree distribution is what is presumed phenomenologically. The system becomes
unstable in the middle value of c where stochastic behavior appears, that is, all C on one occasion,
all D on another occasion. The ratio of cases where the strategy of systems becomes all C is shown
in Fig.3. While this is an average over about 10 times iterations, it is clear that a sort of phase
transition occurs with a order parameter c. D, however, is prevalent in the early of simulations in
all cases. At c > 4, the cases where C drastically becomes prevalent with advancing time steps
take palce, which is shown in the Fig 4. We will make theoretical anayses of these in the next
section.
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4 Theoretical Analyses
4.1 D-C Transition
Even if the strategy of a new node added to the system is C, the strategy of the node turns from
C to D when the total payoff of the newly joining node is not greatest among all nodes connected
to the newly joining node. When C joins in a network system with all D, the payoff Pc that C gets
is given by
Pc = c+ ks = c− tk. (2)
The payoff Pd of nodes with D connected to the newly joining node is given by
Pd = t+ xd = t− xc, (3)
where x is a degree of a node with strategy D.
By demanding Pc > Pd, the condition that the strategy C of the newly joining node does not
turun to D leads to
c+ ks > t+ xd. (4)
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After all we obtain a condition
c >
1 + k
1 + x
t with k = t = 5. (5)
Minimal values of x which satisfy the inequality (5) for various c values are given in Table
2. The situation changes at nearly the critical value of c pointed out in the previous section.
Considering that x is originall meaningful only when x is interger, because x is a degree, it leads to
the fact that while for c > 4.3 a newly joining C node can change D nodes with x = 6 to C nodes
when the D nodes are connect with the C nodes, for c < 4.3 it can do D nodes with only x = 7.
Though the boundary value of x is yet a magic number, we find that there is a gap between regions
with c > 4.3 and c < 4.3 how a newly joined strategy C can easily make a strategy D change into
C.
c > 2 is also enough for this C to propagate through D-dominant world. As a natural conjecture,
it is considered that the magic number x = 6 has some significance and there may be a gap in
strategy distribution at a point near c = 4.3. This fact may be also supported by Fig. 3. We
pursue this conjecture.
Table 2. Minimal values of x satisfying the inequality (5).
c 2 3 3.9 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.8 4.9
x 14 9 6.7 6.5 6.3 6.1 6.0 5.8 5.7 5.5 5.4 5.3 5.1
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Fig. 4 D-C transition and the ratio of degree= 5 among all nodes in n = 600 and c = 4.3.
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Fig. 5 Probability function and its enlarged drawing.
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First of all, Fig. 4 gives a suggestion to study the conjecture. The ratio of nodes with low degree
(x < 6) drastically decreases in the right-hand side of Fig.4 temporarily just when all D world turns
to all C world. After that the ratio increases almost smoothly with time steps. A decrease in the
population of nodes with low degree induce nodes with the strategy D to the strategy C, acoording
the inequality condition (5). The reason is that a newly joining node is apt to mainly builds linkes
with nodes with highly degree due to the decrease.
We consider the condition that a newly joining node connects with nodes with high degrees on
a network with a probabolity of not less than 50 percent. From that, we show that critical value
of c in the C-D transition can be estimated. This is due to the fact that the probability that a
node links with a newly joined node depends on total payoff Ri, which also depends on c. Let us
introduce a possibility p that a node has not less than degree x. From the condition that all five (k
4
in general) nodes linked with a newly joining node with strategy C have not less than x degrees,
we obtain a constraint on p;
p5 > 0.5 −→ p > 0.87. (6)
In the meanwhile, degree distribution for all D world is a linear function, which has phenomeno-
logically a general form (the leftt-hand side of Fig. 1)
Y = αR + β with α = −
2n
152c
<< β =
40n
152
, R = kc. (7)
Nodes with not less than k = 9.4 degree have a majority in all. This value is also an average one
for degree of all nodes which agrees with simulation results not explicitly demonstrated in this
article.
In order to specify the condition that a newly joining node with strategy C can link with
nodes with high degree with a high probability, we first estimate the normalization factor of the
probability in Eq. (1). The total sum of Pi over all nodes is
S(d) =
n∑
i=1
αRi + β
1 + e−Ri/A
∼
∫ Rmax
Rmin
αR+ β
1 + e−Ri/A
dR ∼
∫ 21d
6d
β
1 + e−Ri/A
dR
= βA
(
ln[e6d/A + 1]− ln[e21d/A + 1]
)
. (8)
By using Eq. (7), the sum over nodes is changed to the sum over payoffs in the first equality. Since
the sum of the above sequence can not be analitically calculated, a continuous approximation is
maded in Eq. (8). Furthermore using the inequality in Eq. (7), a analytic expression for S(d) is
obtained in the last equality. If the partial set ∆S of the gross area noted by S in Fig. 5 satisfys
the following inequalty
∆S(d, x)
S(d)
> 0.87, (9)
degree of nodes connected to a newly joining node with C would be larger than x in all likelihood.
Here the explicit representation of the fraction ∆S is given by
∆S(d, x) ≡
∫ d(1+x)
21d
β
1 + e−Ri/A
= βA
(
ln[ed(1+x)/A + 1]− ln[e21d/A + 1]
)
. (10)
Finally we can derive a critical velue d by soluving the following equation;
∆S(d, x = kc)
S(d)
= 0.87, (11)
Though this equation has two unknown quantities kc and d, we can be solved the equation to
find the value d numerically;
{
d = 0.29 for x = 7, this is nonsense,
d = −4.14 for x = 6.
(12)
Note that the solution d = 0.29 for degree x = 7 is meaninglessness, but the meaning solution
d = −4.14, which accords with Fig.3 well, at last appears for x = 6, that is a just magic number.
4.2 Degree Distribution Function
We follow the method adopted by Brabashi et al.[2] in order to find a degree distribution function
in this model. The corresponding equation to the one used by Brabashi et. al.[2] for ki in the
present model is given by
∂ki(t)
∂t
=
m
S(1 + e−Ri/A)
=
m
S(1 + e−rki/A)
, (13)
where r = c or d. S at a time step t for both cases, all C and all D, is a linear function of t as
shown in Fig.6;
S ∼ γt. (14)
where γ is some proportionality.
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Solving the differential Eq. (13) under the initial condition of t = t0, ki = m = 5, we obtain
(ki(t)−m) +
A
r
(e−rm/A − e−rki(t)/A) =
m
γ
loge
t
t0
. (15)
Though we can not give any analytic expression of ki(t), we have only to find a t0 derivative
of ki(t). According to Barabashi et. al.[2], a distributon function can be given by
P (k) = −
1
∂ki(t)/∂t0
. (16)
So we obtain the below equation;
P (k) ∼
γt
5
1 + e−rk/30
eγ(k−5)/5e6γ/r(e−γ/6 − e−rk/30)
,
=
γt
5
coth rk/60
eγ(k−5)/5e6γ/r
(17)
∼ O(1)−O(k1) for r = d (18)
∼ eγ(5−k)/5[O(1)−O(k1)] for r = c (19)
Eq. (18) in the third line shows that P (k) linealy decrease with k approximately in all D world and
Eq. (19) roughly shows an exponential damping with respect to k with some correction at in all
C world. Both of them are consisyent with simulation results in section2. In fact both theoretical
estimation coming from Eq. (17) and simulation results are comapared for an all D case and an
all C case in Fig.8 and 9, respectively. The results of simulations conform with theoretical ones for
both cases well.
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Fig.6 S(t) for all C world (left) and all D world (right).
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Fig.7 Degree distributions of simulation for n = 500 and k = 5 (left) and theory (γ = 1/3) (right)
at c = 4.5
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Fig.8 Degree distributions of simulation for n = 1200 and k = 5 (left) and theory (γ = 1/15)
(right) at c = 4.0
In such a way, a critical point and behaviour of degree distributions before and after the critical
point can be explained theoretically.
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4.3 A-dependence
We chose A = 30 in order to analyze in a linear part of Eq.(1) in the presented model. When the
value of A, however, changes, how results descibed in the previous sections differ? In this section
we investigate the effects of A-value, especially small A.
At A = 10, the degree distribution function is such triangular in shape as Fig.9, which shows
that the degree grows larger as k but drops at much larger k. This occurs because the probability
P rapidly decreases at A = 10 as k grows larger. The movement in the function P (k) at A = 10
and A = 30 when c = 4.0 is shown in Fig.10. When nodes with small k first are connected to
a newly joining node with greater probability in D-dominate world. So the population of nodes
with a little larger k increases. A similar phenomenon occurs every time newly joining nodes are
addes to the network. These propagate into larger k step by step. Nodes with excessively large k,
however, are rarely connected by links to a newly joining nodes conversely, since the probability P
rapidly decreases as k grows larger. The population of nodes with mean values of k increses due
to that reason, while nodes with larger k are hard to increase.
These facts show that degree distribution functions largely depend on the shape of a probability
function.
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Fig.9 Degree distributions for n = 900, k = 5 and c = 4.0 at A = 10.
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Fig.10 P (k) at A = 10 (the lower curve) and A = 30 (the upper curve) at c = 4.0
5 Summary
In this article we proposed a model where game dynamics are working on a network and links
are attached preferentially in proportion to total payoffs received by nodes. According to the
model, computer simulations are made to estimate degree distributions and analyse time series of
strategies. We have found a sort of phase transition occurs with a order parameter c. Though
we only analyze a few phenomena in this article, but they can be quantitatively explained in the
theoretical point of view. The results are sensitive to the shape of a probability function that
controls preferential attachment. Since there will be much interesting phenomena that should be
explored in models that consider inner interactions among nodes in network growth, much wider
properties of them should be investigated in details.
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